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STATE OF UTAH, et al. 
Defendants. 
MALCOLM A. MISURACA; HALEY & 
STOLEBARGER; DOUGLAS B. ] 
PROVENCHER; and BEYERS, COSTIN ] 
& CASE, ] 
Appellants. 
| Case No. 900012 
i Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
The order appealed from was certified as a final judg-
ment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on January 
2, 1990. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
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ISSUE1 
Did the trial court err in reducing the attorney fee 
award where there was no evidence of record to support the re-
duction and the overwhelming majority of class members approved 
of the court's initial award of attorney fees? 
A trial court's award of attorney fees in a class action 
is reviewed for abuse of the court's discretion. See Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); In re Montgomery 
County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 83..F.R.D. 305, 321 (D. 
Md. 1979). However, once the trial court determines what con-
stitutes a reasonable fee, it commits legal error if it awards 
less than the reasonable fee. Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
991. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Interpretation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) 
is determinative of this appeal. That rule reads: "A class 
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval 
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise 
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as 
the court directs." 
1
 In their brief, the appellants identify nineteen issues 
presented for review. However, the appellants' argument treats 
some of these issues only tangentially and ignores others (such 
as issues 18 and 19). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an award of attorney fees to 
the appellants, the attorneys for the plaintiffs in a class action 
(the appellees or depositors). The class action seeks recovery 
of money the depositors lost when the five thrifts in which their 
money was deposited failed. The course of proceedings and dis-
position below are set out in the appellants' Statement of the 
Case. 
The appellees do not dispute the facts set forth in 
the so-called Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal (ap-
pendix D to Brief of Appellants), but have not agreed that that 
statement of facts may be considered in lieu of a record on ap-
peal. In addition to the facts set forth in the agreed statement 
of facts, the following facts are relevant to the issue presented 
for review. 
1. Between May 1987 and March 1988, after the written 
attorney fee agreement was entered into between the appellants 
and the Thrift Depositors Class Action Committee, sign-up cards 
were sent to all prospective class memebers. One hundred percent 
of those responding (some 80 percent of the prospective class) 
accepted the representation of the appellants. The depositors 
also authorized the steering committee of the depositor organi-
zation, Depositors of Insured Thrifts (DOIT), to act on their 
- 3 -
behalf. See Record at 1562-68, 106, 726; exs. 23-25 from July 
17, 1989, hearing. 
2. After the partial settlement was reached with 
the state, 99.99 percent of the class responding voted to accept 
the settlement and approved an award of attorney fees of up to 
$7,250,000. See Record at 1523-24, 1778-80, 2039-40. 
3. In a survey of the class members taken after the 
partial settlement, in the first quarter of 1989, an overwhelming 
majority of the depositor class (over 90 percent of those respond-
ing) voted to authorize DOIT and its counsel to continue their 
recovery efforts on behalf of the depositors. See Record at 2280. 
4. After the trial court's initial award of attorney 
fees and before the court reduced that award, DOIT retained in-
dependent counsel to represent the class with respect to the 
attorney fee issue. (That counsel represents the appellees on 
this appeal.) 
5. Based upon the advice of their independent counsel 
and their desire to resolve the issues before this court without 
protracted litigation, the depositors, through their representa-
tives, and the appellants have agreed to settle the attorney 
fee dispute on the following terms: 
(a) The parties agree that a reasonable fee in this 
matter to be awarded to the appellants is the sum of 
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$5,400,000.00 as of December 6, 1988, together with interest 
that has accrued thereon. 
(b) The parties agree that the sum of $400,000.00, 
together with interest that has accrued thereon from December 
6, 1988, should be disbursed to and held by the depositors' 
representative, DOIT, for and on behalf of the depositor 
class, to pay the on-going expenses of litigation and other 
expenses that DOIT determines necessary to further the in-
terests of the class. At the conclusion of the litigation, 
the balance should be paid to the class. 
(c) The parties agree that 20 percent constitutes a 
reasonable attorney fee on all amounts recovered for and 
on behalf of the appellees in the future. 
The depositor plaintiffs and the board of DOIT have unanimously 
approved this settlement and agreed that this Court may enter 
an order approving this settlement and dismissing this appeal. 
(A copy of the parties' Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal on the above 
terms is included in the Addendum.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellees are in an anomalous position in this 
case. On the one hand, they are the apparent beneficiaries of 
the trial court's decision, which, on its face, appears to save 
them $1,550,000 in attorney fees. Obviously, no one likes to pay 
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his attorneys more money than he has to. But, on the other hand, 
the depositors feel strongly that they were poorly dealt with 
by the defendants and that agreements they had a right to rely 
on were not kept. They do not want their attorneys to be treated 
the same way, and they feel that their attorneys cire entitled 
to a fee of 20 percent of the recovered funds under the spirit 
if not the letter of the written attorney fee agreement. By 
ignoring the depositors' wishes and their express authorization, 
thereby frustrating their good faith undertaking with class coun-
sel, the trial court has jeopardized the depositors' chances of 
recovering much more than the $1,550,000 under the remaining 
claims in the pending lawsuit. 
While the depositors do not accept all of the appel-
lants' arguments on appeal, they are pleased with the results 
that the appellants have obtained for them thus far and want 
the appellants to continue to represent them in prosecuting their 
pending claims against other defendants. The depositors over-
whelmingly approved a fee award greater than the trial court's 
initial award and were satisfied with that award. The trial 
court abused its discretion in reducing that award in the absence 
of any competent evidence justifying the reduction. (Point I.) 
The depositors and the appellants have now agreed to 
settle the attorney fee issue for a mutually acceptable amount 
that is even less than the trial court's initial award. This 
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court should approve the settlement and allow the parties to 
get on with the principal business of recovering the depositors' 
money. (Point II.) 
It is in the best interests of all concerned to approve 
an award of attorney fees that is acceptable both to the deposi-
tors and their counsel. The trial court's initial fee award 
and the settlement reached on appeal are acceptable to both sides. 
The trial court's reduced fee award is not. Therefore, this 
Court should either approve the settlement of this appeal or 




THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REDUCING 
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD IT HAD PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED 
TO BE REASONABLE. 
An attorney representing a class is entitled to an 
attorney's fee from funds realized or collected by the attorney's 
efforts on behalf of the class. See, e.g.. Boeing Co. v. Van 
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Citv of Detroit v. Grinnell 
Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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A trial court's authority to approve a fee award to 
the attorney for a plaintiff class stems from rule 23(e) of the 
rules of civil procedure:2 
Rule 23(e) requires court approval of any 
class action settlement, even if the settle-
ment is acceptable to the class representa-
tives . This approval function extends to 
any negotiated liability for attorney's fees 
as well as the settlement on the merits. 
Courts have used this approval authority to 
review the settlements and, on occasion, to 
reduce negotiated fees. 
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal .Practice, I 23.91 at 
23-533 (2d ed. 1987). The rationale for the court's oversight 
function is that the court "must serve as a guardian of the rights 
of absent class members." Grunin v. International House of Pan-
cakes , 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert, denied 423 U.S. 864 
(1975). Otherwise, it is feared that attorneys will take ad-
vantage of class actions to obtain lucrative fees that they have 
not earned. The interests of the attorneys may conflict with 
the interests of class members, since any fee award may reduce 
the class members' recovery. In such a situation, the class 
has no one to represent them. It is thus up to the court, as 
the guardian of the public interest, to give voice to the voice-
2
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which is identical 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), states: "A class action 
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of 
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise 
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as 
the court directs." 
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less. See, e.g., In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. 
Supp. 963, 967-68 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 
86 F.R.D. 752, 758-59 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
This rationale has little force in this case, where 
99.99% of the class approved an attorney fee award up to 
$7,250,000.00. The fee initially awarded—$5,800,000.00~was 
well within the range approved by the class members. Moreover, 
that award was based on competent evidence, presented in open 
court and after a hearing at which the depositors had an oppor-
tunity to appear and voice their objections to the award. Before 
making its initial award, the court was aware of all objections 
to the fee award—both from depositors and from the defendants 
—and had an opportunity to fully consider them. In making its 
initial award, the trial court considered and made findings, 
based on evidence of record, with respect to eight different 
factors. It found that a fee at the minimum of the parties' 
contingent fee agreement (20 percent) was reasonable, and applied 
that rate to the $29 million portion of the $44 million recovery, 
since the appellants had requested their fee only from the $29 
million. 
The trial court abused its discretion in thereafter 
reducing the attorney fee award.3 An award of attorney fees 
3 The appellants argue that the law of the case doctrine 
precluded the trial court from reducing the fee award. The law 
of the case doctrine does not apply in this case. Under that 
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must be supported by evidence in the record. Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). But once the trial 
court determines what constitutes a reasonable fee, it is an 
abuse of discretion to award less absent evidence of record sup-
porting a reduction. Ici. at 991. 
The trial court's revision of its initial attorney 
fee award was not justified by any evidence of record. After 
the court's initial award, there was no new evidence presented. 
There were no objections to the fee award from depositors. The 
only objection to the award came from the special master appointed 
to review requests for cost reimbursements to expert witnesses 
and others, and the special master's objections were not based 
on any evidence of record. Indeed, the special master held no 
hearings, took no evidence and heard no witnesses in the manner 
contemplated by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c).4 
doctrine, a decision on an issue of law at one stage of a case 
is binding in successive stages of the same litigation. See IB 
J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 5 
0.404[1] at 117 (2d ed. 1988). The reasonableness of an attorney 
fee award is not a question of law but of fact. See, e.g., Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Wollcrast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 
1191, 1197 (1974). Moreover, the law of the case doctrine does 
not limit the power of a court to reconsider its interlocutory 
decisions. IB J. Moore, et al., supra, f 0.404[4.-1]. Because 
the trial court's initial award was not a final judgment, it 
was subject to revision at any time before entry of a final judg-
ment. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The only question is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in revising the award. 
* After submitting his report and recommendation recom-
mending that the attorney fee award be reduced, the special master 
held a hearing at class counsel's request but did not allow any 
- 10 -
Where, as here, the trial court discounts a fee based 
on factors not supported by the record, the judgment should be 
reversed. Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991. The trial court 
abused its discretion in revising the fee award that it had pre-
viously detennined to be reasonable where no objections to the 
award were made by class members and there were no exceptional 
circumstances or other reasons justifying a reduction in the 
amount of fees awarded. 
II-
THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE PARTIES' SETTLEMENT 
OF THIS APPEAL. 
Between December 6, 1988, when the trial court entered 
its order awarding the appellants $5,800,000, and the present, 
significant amounts of time and effort were devoted by counsel 
for all parties to the issues concerning attorney fees, all of 
which detracted from the main focus of the litigation, namely, 
recovery of the depositors' funds. 
Considering the length of time that has passed since 
the appellees suffered their original losses and since the court's 
original award of attorney fees, the parties to this appeal con-
testimony to be presented. The only evidence taken was by prof-
fer. Any other evidence the special master may have considered 
did not comply with such due process requirements as notice and 
an opportunity to be heard, to present evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses. 
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eluded that a settlement of the issues on appeal was in the best 
interests of all parties. 
The class representatives have retained separate counsel 
to represent the appellees' interests in connection with the 
attorney fee issue and this appeal and have independently sought 
their advice and their analysis of the issues and the risks in-
volved. Based upon the advice of their independent counsel, 
the depositors, through their representatives, have agreed to 
settle the attorney fee dispute. Under the terms of the settle-
ment, the appellants have agreed to take $400,000 less than the 
initial fee award, and the $400,000 thus saved will be available 
to pay the on-going expenses of litigating the depositors' pending 
claims against the other defendants. 
The settlement is in the best interests of the depositor 
class. The depositors have claims pending against the other 
defendants. These claims have received little attention for 
the last year, while the appellants have been awaiting and chal-
lenging the special master's Third Interim Report cind Recommen-
dation and the trial court's memorandum decision based thereon. 
The depositors want the appellants to continue to represent them 
in their pending claims against the other defendants. The de-
positors believe that it would require a substantial investment 
of time and money for other attorneys to take over the prosecution 
of the depositors' claims against the other defendants. If this 
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court approves the settlement, the depositors' attorneys will 
have a solution they find acceptable, the depositors will have 
cash with which to pursue their remaining claims, and both sides 
can immediately get on with the business of recovering additional 
monies, for the benefit of all class members. 
CONCLUSION 
Obviously, the depositors are not interested in paying 
their attorneys an excessive fee. However, the depositors are 
pleased with the results their attorneys have obtained thus far 
in pulling some $44,000,000.00 out of a hat that everyone thought 
was empty. The depositors believe that their chances of recover-
ing even more of their lost funds will be increased if the same 
attorneys continue to represent them in the actions still pending. 
Any change in their representation at this time could jeopardize 
the depositors' chances of further recovery. The depositors thus 
have a strong interest in resolving the attorney fee issue in a 
way that is acceptable to both sides to this appeal. 
Accordingly, the depositors respectfully request that 
this court approve the stipulated settlement between them and 
the appellants. In the alternative, the depositors respectfully 
request that the court reverse the trial court's October 31, 
1989, Memorandum Decision and reinstate the trial court's December 
- 13 -
6, 1988, Order awarding the appellants attorney fees in the amount 
of $5,800,000.00. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 1990. 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON, ESQ. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
and 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR., ESQ. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Bys 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief of Appellees was mailed, postage 
prepaid thereon, this 18th day of May, 1990, to: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
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Thomas T. Billings, Esq. 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Jan C. Graham 
Reed M. Stringham, III 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Sheila Bohard 
D.O.I.T. 
P.O. Box 9516 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOLLY PLUMB, et al, ! 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, : 
vs. i 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al, i 
Defendants, i 
MALCOMB A. MISURACA, HALEY & i 
STOLEBARGER, DOUGLAS B. 
PROVENCHER, and BEYERS, COSTIN & : 
CASE, 
{ STIPULATION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL 
: Case No. 900012 
Third District Court 
t Civil No. C87-4879 
Appellants* 
Appellants, Malcoxnb A. Hisuraca, Haley & Stolebarger, 
Douglas B. Provencher, and Beyers, Costin & Case, by and through 
their attorney Jackson Howard, Esq. and Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq, 
and Appellees, by and through their counsel, on Appeal, Craig G. 
Adamson, Esq. and Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq., stipulate and agree 
as follows: 
1. This Appeal is before this Court pursuant to a Rule 
54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure certification on the sole issue 
of the attorneys' fees to be awarded to Appellants as counsel for 
Appellees under an agreement for attorneys' fees entered into 
between the parties. 
2. The action underlying this Appeal involves the 
Appellees as a depositor class and its representatives (Depositors 
of Insured Thrifts known as "DOIT") consisting of approximately 
seven thousand (7,000) households holding approximately seventeen 
thousand (17,000) accounts in five failed thrift institutions in 
the State of Utah, who seek recovery of the lost deposit accounts. 
Appellees have not had access to the funds in their accounts since 
July 31, 1986. 
3. Subsequent to the failure of the thrift institutions, 
Appellees, through their representatives, employed Appellants to 
represent them. This occurred after an extensive search and 
interview process involving a number of prospective attorneys. 
After negotiations between the Appellants' and Appellees' 
representatives, a written attorneys' fee agreement was reached 
between Appellants and Appellees. The written attorneys' fee 
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agreement provided, among other things, that Appellants would be 
awarded a reasonable attorneys' fee to be determined by the Trial 
Court and the parties agreed that a reasonable fee would be between 
twenty (20) and forty (40) percent of the recovery. 
4. Thereafter, one hundred percent (100%) of the class 
members responding (of 80% of the class polled) expressly consented 
to and ratified the Fee Agreement. 
5. Appellees are of the view that Appellants thereupon 
devoted a substantial portion of their time%nd financial resources 
for the benefit of Appellees, including extensive discovery, 
investigation and research in establishing the validity of the 
claims of the Appellees. Despite the substantial obstacles to 
any successful recovery, Appellants were successful in securing a 
partial recovery for Appellees in the approximate sum of $44 
million. 
6. Weighing the risks and obstacles mitigating against 
any significant recovery in this action, it is the belief of 
Appellees that Appellants' efforts in raising and advocating novel 
and effective legal theories resulted in a recovery that would 
not have occurred without the efforts of Appellants. 
7. Thereafter, a petition to establish the amount of 
attorneys' fees was filed with the Trial Court pursuant to the 
Agreement between the parties. In that petition, Appellants cledmed 
that a fee of twenty-five percent (25%) of $29 million of the total 
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$44 million recovery was reasonable. Notice was given to all 
members of the class and a hearing was scheduled at which the 
parties could raise objections and at which the fee claimed would 
be presented to the Court for approval. Only two depositors filed 
objections to the claimed fee and the record discloses no evidence 
that any member of the class appeared in Court at the time of the 
hearing to object to the claimed fee. 
8. The settlement with the State was submitted for 
approval to the depositor class, with notice that the fees to 
counsel for the class might run as high as $7,250,000. The class 
overwhelmingly voted to accept the settlement; 99.99% of the vote 
on the settlement was in favor of its acceptance. 
9. Thereafter, after full and proper notice was given 
and an opportunity to be heard was provided as required by law, 
the Trial Court, by Memorandum Decision dated December 5, 1988, 
determined that a reasonable attorneys' fee to be awarded to 
Appellants was twenty percent (20%) of $29 million, or 
$5,800,000.00. That ruling was reduced to a formal, written 
decision on December 6, 1988. 
10. Subsequent to that award and during most of the 
succeeding year, significant amounts of time and effort were devoted 
by counsel for all parties to the issue before the Trial Court 
concerning attorneys' fees, all of which detracted from the main 
focus of the litigation, namely, to recover the lost funds. 
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11. Subsequent to the entry of the Trial Court's order 
making that award, a number of events occurred, many of which are, 
or are expected to be, part of the issues on this Appeal, relating 
to the appointment of a Special Master and the subsequent 
modification of the Trial Court's award of attorneys' fees, whereby 
in November 1989, nearly a year later, the fees for Appellants were 
reduced to $4,250,000. 
12. It is from that November 1989 ruling of the Trial 
Court that Appellants have appealed to thi| Court. 
13. Considering the length of time that has passed since 
Appellees and the class suffered the original loss, and the period 
of time having elapsed since the Court's original award of 
attorneys' fees on December 5, 1988, and in light of the 
significant, troubling and complicated legal issues presented or 
expected to be presented to this Court on this Appeal, both parties 
are of the belief that an extensive Appeal process and likely 
further litigation before the Trial Court on these issues do not 
serve the best interest of the depositors or the public and will 
only delay the completion of the litigation process leading up to 
a potential recovery of additional amounts and sums lost by the 
Appellees resulting from the failure of the thrifts. From the 
foregoing, both parties have concluded that a settlement of the 
issues on this Appeal is in the best interest of all parties. 
14. In a survey of the depositors at the time of the 
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settlement with the State, an overwhelming majority of the depositor 
class (94.40%) voted to authorize DOIT and its counsel to carry 
out the best interests of the depositors. This settlement has 
been unanimously approved by the depositor plaintiffs and by the 
board of DOIT. 
15. Appellees have now retained separate counsel to 
represent their interests in connection with the fee dispute and 
this Appeal, and have independently sought their advice and analysis 
of the issues and risks of this case. Based upon the advice those 
counsel, and Appellees' independent belief that the fee agreed to 
herein in resolution of this matter, is a reasonable fee, and based 
upon the Appellants' desire to resolve the issues before this Court 
without protracted litigation, both parties stipulate and agree 
as follows: 
a. A reasonable fee in this matter to be awarded 
to Appellants is the sum of $5,400,000, as of December 6, 
1988, together with interest which has accrued thereon. 
This Court should enter an order in settlement of this Appeal 
awarding Appellants such amount; 
b. The sum of $400,000, together with interest 
which has accrued thereon from and after December 6, 1988, 
should be disbursed to and held by the Appellees' 
representative, the Depositors of Insured Thrifts (DOIT), 
for and on behalf of the Appellees and the depositor class 
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to enable Appellees to meet and pay the ongoing expenses of 
litigation and other expenses as determined by DOIT necessary 
to further the interests of the class and at the conclusion 
of the litigation to pay the balance to the class. This Court 
should enter an order in settlement of this Appeal, directing 
the distribution of such award. 
c. Twenty percent (20%) is the percentage the 
parties agree constitutes a reasonable attorneys' fee on all 
amounts recovered for and on behalf of Appellees in the future. 
The Court should enter an order in settlement of this Appeal 
approving twenty percent (20%) attorneys' fee for Appellants 
on all amounts recovered for and on behalf of Appellees 
hereafter under the original Fee Agreement between the parties. 
DATED this / ^ d a v of April, 1990. 
KiCtmcrtL dfiW^<^ 
ckson Howard, Esq. 
slie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Appellants 
and 
Stekatt M. 
Syitter Axlan 
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